The energy transition represents a historic opportunity for societal transformation. It should help dismantle the power of large oil corporations, foster local value creation, and strengthen democratic control over energy systems. These possibilities arise because fossil fuels such as gas and oil can be monopolised by specific actors—states and/or corporations that control resource-rich territories. By contrast, sunlight and wind are available everywhere and largely cannot be monopolised. Households, firms, and other actors can therefore generate their own electricity.

It is often argued that this broader distribution of renewable energy resources can give rise to a more democratic energy system (“energy democracy”; see Szulecki 2018). However, I argue that power and value creation are not automatically tied to energy sources themselves; rather, they depend on who controls the new infrastructures and technologies. This means that the energy transition also opens up new opportunities for monopolising critical data through artificial intelligence (AI).

Why data and AI matter for the energy transition

Renewable energy systems require data and AI for two main reasons. First, electrification and so-called sector coupling—the integration of heating, transport, and industry into the electricity system—are driving rapidly rising demand. As these sectors shift from fossil fuels to electricity, demand becomes both higher and harder to predict.

Second, the renewable energy supply is intermittent. Because there are times of day when renewable generation is particularly abundant, demand must increasingly be adapted to supply. This marks a departure from the fossil-fuel-based model, where electricity generation was simply adjusted to meet demand. Managing fluctuating supply alongside rising and cross-sectoral demand is therefore highly complex and requires large, fine-grained datasets to train predictive models. These models enable decisions such as when electric vehicle batteries should be charged or when they should feed electricity back into the grid.

A central question of the energy transition is therefore who owns energy-related data, computing capacity, and artificial intelligence (Weko 2024). At present, these key resources for training AI models are largely controlled by major technology corporations such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft.

The energy transition as a new opportunity for big tech monopolies

These firms have already established monopolies in other sectors by controlling intangible assets (Durand & Milberg, 2020; Rikap, 2023). These assets include data, algorithms, software, and digital infrastructure. Through their cloud services, they have gained significant power over the global economy and politics.

The “cloud” is essentially a centralised system in which data is stored and processed in corporate data centres. Instead of each firm operating its own data infrastructure, cloud-based data management creates economies of scale and is often more efficient. Both the physical and digital components of cloud systems become more efficient as they scale: the more users a data centre serves, the more optimally storage and computing capacity can be allocated. Cloud providers can also shift energy-intensive processes to times when electricity is cheaper or cleaner.

At the same time, using the cloud creates profound dependencies on Big Tech, because the underlying systems and technologies are opaque “black boxes.” Organisations that rely on cloud services build their daily operations atop these infrastructures and can switch providers only at great cost. This dependence creates complex webs of power in which firms and states alike rely on the infrastructures of cloud giants. Even large and innovative companies become dependent on these platforms (Franco et al. 2023; Franco et al. 2024). Companies that use AI cloud services can become sources of information for Google, Amazon, and Microsoft even without granting direct access to their data: algorithms learn through processing data, including encrypted data (Lauter 2022).

The same dynamics are unfolding in the energy sector. Many energy system actors rely on cloud services to manage systems and develop innovations. As a result, cloud giants learn from energy sector data and develop their own innovations for energy systems.

New dependencies and risks: Big Tech in the energy transition

Cloud giants actively promote lock-in effects for energy actors. One example is “cloud grants”—credits for free cloud usage offered through startup competitions run by Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure. Startups participating in these programs develop their green innovations on Big Tech’s cloud infrastructures, locking themselves into long-term dependency (Rikap & Weko 2025).

Another example of how lock-in develops comes from Google’s involvement with transmission system operators. “Tapestry,” a project by Google X, develops technologies for visualising and planning electricity grids. Several transmission operators, including Chile’s Coordinador Eléctrico Nacional, collaborate with Tapestry and share data to create near real-time virtualisations of power grids and new planning tools. This data is highly valuable, as Tapestry’s access helps improve its models. Since September 2024, Chile’s grid planning has been fully based on Tapestry systems. Tapestry relies on Google Cloud and DeepMind, and collaborates closely with US energy actors. Google is thus becoming an increasingly central player in energy system planning— a position it could potentially leverage to its own advantage.

Similar dependencies are emerging elsewhere in the energy system. Large and innovative firms are increasingly abandoning their own digital infrastructures in favor of cloud solutions perceived as cheaper. For example, the Danish wind company Vestas previously had major in-house modeling capacities; its supercomputer, “Firestorm,” was one of the fastest privately used computers in the world. In 2021, Vestas began running its models on Microsoft Azure, and by 2024, it had fully migrated its modeling activities to the platform.

At the same time, Big Tech firms are developing their own renewable energy innovations to increase profits. For example, Amazon is active in wind and solar energy, battery technologies, and electric mobility. Since 2016, Amazon has expanded renewable energy generation for its data centres and by 2025 had built more than 25 gigawatts of capacity. To optimise its energy use, Amazon established a dedicated “Renewable Energy Operations” team that uses AI to manage electricity production and consumption. Such innovations are crucial for cloud giants, as energy costs and sustainability concerns become central to AI operations. These technologies are also marketed to other firms, creating new dependencies and rent streams.

At first glance, this may appear benign: Big Tech firms invest in climate solutions, and energy actors become more efficient. The problem, however, lies in the long-term dependency relationships these developments create. Research shows that firms building their systems on Big Tech cloud platforms become locked in, unable to switch providers without major costs and are forced to accept rising prices for infrastructure and innovation. Moreover, Big Tech firms undermine competition by acquiring smaller rivals or obstructing their development (Durand & Milberg 2020; Rikap 2023; Rikap & Lundvall 2022).

A just energy transition in public hands

These dynamics have profound implications for ecological transformations. Although the energy transition is conceived as a social and environmental project, the monopolisation of data and AI allows large technology firms to capture economic gains. Big Tech also seeks to shape socio-ecological transformations through narratives about the “right” transition pathway—one aligned with their interests (Rikap & Weko 2025). As a result, not only the energy transition but the environment itself risks becoming another arena for the consolidation of tech monopolies.

A future-oriented economy must take a different path. It should promote local value creation—especially in Europe—enable innovation by small and medium-sized enterprises, and be democratically governed, independent of both “Big Oil” and “Big Tech.”

Political action is required to regulate monopolies more strictly. The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) is a step in this direction, as it seeks to reduce lock-in by requiring cloud providers to enable switching. However, Google, Amazon, and Microsoft still control around 70% of the European cloud market (Synergy Research Group 2025), making finding alternatives difficult. Although initiatives such as Germany’s Schwarz Digits aim to build domestic cloud services, competing with Big Tech is extremely challenging. These firms not only control existing infrastructure but have spent decades accumulating and processing AI data, acquiring top startups, and shaping global scientific systems—creating monopolies over knowledge production itself (Rikap 2023).

Existing monopolies must therefore be actively dismantled, and cloud services separated organizationally from platform companies. Through international cooperation, reliable public alternatives to US cloud giants must be established. Europe has attempted this through initiatives such as Gaia-X, which initially aimed to build European infrastructure through active industrial policy, akin to Airbus. However, cloud giants quickly sidelined the project by reframing it as a debate about standards and interoperability (Obendiek & Seidl 2023).

Alternative initiatives must return to the public sector, because the cloud is a form of public infrastructure—like energy or transport—without which modern economies cannot function. When profit-oriented private actors monopolise such infrastructures, they inevitably serve private interests. A public cloud, by contrast, could be designed so that revenues and innovations benefit society as a whole (Rikap et al. 2024), supporting democratic and collective structures rather than corporate dominance.

Only if these steps are taken can the energy transition become a truly sustainable and democratically governed transformation. Otherwise, it risks becoming yet another domain in which power and profit remain concentrated in the hands of a few, while the societal promises of just energy transitions remain unfulfilled.

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Editorial Note:

This article is produced as part of a collaboration between Rethinking Economics International, Makronom and the Economists for Future DE and was originally written in German language. The 2026 contributions engage with ongoing debates on anti-authoritarian and anti-fascist perspectives on economic policy, with particular attention to how social security arrangements can help counter authoritarian and nationalist tendencies. Contributions in this series also explore welfare state design, property relations, pension systems, and institutional reforms with a view to strengthening democratic cohesion, ecological stability, and economic resilience. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the participating platforms.

About the author:

Silvia Weko has been a research associate at the Chair of Sustainability Transition Policy at FAU Erlangen–Nuremberg since 2023. Her research focuses on the politics of sustainability transitions and the actors shaping the creation and distribution of economic value. From 2019 to 2023, she worked as a research associate at the Research Institute for Sustainability (RIFS), focusing on the geopolitics of green hydrogen, technology transfer and innovation, data and intellectual property transformations, and EU sustainability policy. She completed her PhD in 2023 at the University of Erfurt’s Graduate Center for Effective and Innovative Policy Design in Contested Contexts (EIPCC), where her dissertation received second prize in the German Study Award competition.

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